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Introduction 
The central topic of this present essay will be the question how Husserl ascends from the level 
of pure physical materiality to the level of conscious animal nature. It could be characterized as 
a reversed way of constitution. In Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology the normal, stand-
ard way of constitution was a so-to-say “inside-outside” direction: reduction to the immanence 
of pure consciousness, then moving towards different levels and types of transcendences; to-
wards different levels of material and spiritual reality, which exist independent from our own 
mind, from our own sphere of ownness. As we could read in the second volume of Ideas (1912), 
which is devoted to the problem of constitution, there are three fundamental constitutive layers 
in mind-transcendent reality: pure physicality, animality and spiritual reality. Pure physicality 
founds animality, and that latter founds spirituality; each serves as a foundational layer for the 
other, “higher” level of reality. Next to this “inside-outside” way of constitution we can also 
speak of an opposite, “outside-inside” direction; when we face a fully constituted living being, 
and raise the question, how its internal, mental life, physic reality is constituted from the out-
side, from a third person view perspective. The question is: how can we constitute, “from the 
outside”, experiencing the physical body (Körper) of the organism, its “inside”, its internal, 
mental aspect; and thus: how can we constitute its physical body (Körper) as lived body (Leib) 
at the very same time? 
We shall start at the constitution of pure materiality. The awkwardness of situation could 
be seen at once: even the constitution of merely physical entities involves complex conscious 
achievements, activities; and, in this way, a certain degree of self-constitution of subjectivity 
itself. The constitution of materiality and self-constitution of subjectivity are interwoven. Con-
stitution of physical things does not mean merely staring at them, motionless. It needs bodily 
movements: movements of the eye, hands, the head, movements in space. Constitution of phys-
ical things requires necessarily the constitution of our lived body (Leib), and in this way our 
bodily (embodied) subjectivity, which is situated within a physical environment. There is an 
interrelated relationship1 between the constitution of the own body, and the surrounding world 
                                                          
1 This interrelated relationship or circularity between constitution of bodily subject and the things could be clearily 
seen e.g., amongst others in Thing and Space-lecture (Hua [= Husserliana] 16 [1907]), in the second volume of 
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of physical entities. This intertwined relationship characterizes the higher levels of constitution: 
the level of animality and spirituality. Similarly to what we found in the Logical Investigation 
and in the Crisis,2 there is a peculiar “zigzag”-structure between self-constitution and thing- 
(and world-)constitution; moving from subjective side of the intentional relationship, to the 
objective side, and back. This circularity, this zigzag-structure gains an even more sophisticated 
form on the higher levels of self- and thing- (and world-)constitution. This interrelatedness, this 
circularity in the constitution is another characteristic example of Husserl’s ultimately non-
foundationalist account of experience and things.3 
This interlacement between the subjective and objective side of constitution (between the 
relationship of embodied mind and experienced things and situation in the world) makes very 
complicated to explain the difference between merely physical and animated nature; and – at 
the very same time – this insight makes possible a scientifically and philosophically more ac-
curate, non-reductivist explanation of the mind-body relationship and of the emergence of con-
sciousness (conscious subjective experience) in the natural world. This problem (the interre-
lated structure of the constitution of subjectivity and objectivity) is strongly connected with the 
question: how can we separate merely physical things, or non-conscious living beings from 
living beings with subjective, conscious experience? We can call this question demarcation-
problem of conscious and non-conscious entities in the world. This problem leads us to the 
issue of constitution of animal beings and animal subjectivity. The question is: when we can 
attribute consciousness (subjective, conscious experience) to a living being and why? In my 
opinion this field of investigation (animal consciousness) could shed light on the origins of 
consciousness in general, on its most essential features, and on its basic relationship with the 
body. 
For Husserl the problem of animals, and particularly: animal consciousness, was not a mar-
ginal topic; though we cannot say that it was central for him either. But he returned to this 
problem from time to time; and – on the basis of textual places he devoted to the question – it 
                                                          
Ideas (= Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy) (Hua 4 [1912]), in 
Analyses of passive synthesis (Hua 11 [1918-1926]), in the texts of Husserliana 39 and in late D-Manuscripts. 
2 Logical Investigations: Hua 19/1: 22, [English <2001>: 174]. Crisis [= The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology]: Hua 6: 59, [English <1970>: 58]. Cf. also: Péter András Varga: “The Architec-
tonic and History of Phenomenology. Distinguish-ing between Fink’s and Husserl’s Notion of Phenomenological 
Philosophy”. In Phenomenology 2010 Vol. 4: Selected Essays from Northern Europe, edited by Dermot Moran 
and Hans Rainer Sepp, 87–114. Bucharest / Paris: Zeta Books / Argos. 
3 For a non-foundationalist interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy see e.g. John Drummond: Husserlian Intention-
ality and Non-Foundational Realism. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. Anthony 
Steinbock: Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1995. 
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is obvious, that he realized the special importance of the issue from the point of view of expla-
nation of appearance of consciousness in the natural world. A fundamental point of this prob-
lem-field is whether every living being is conscious at the same time, or to live and to be con-
scious does not mean the same? Because Husserl does not have a fully elaborated, systematic 
theory of animals (although, he has systematic trains of thoughts on this topic), we can find 
conflicting sentences and considerations in him, in this question. There are some textual places, 
according to which Husserl denies, or at least sceptical, whether plants or microbes have some-
thing like a consciousness.4 But there is a significant amount of other textual places, which 
shows the outlines of a radically different theory; a doctrine, which we could call “biopsy-
chism”, so such an idea, according to which every living being has a sort of consciousness of 
its own.5 We can find such a theory (id est: biopsychism) in authors like Lynn Margulis,6 Hum-
berto Maturana and Francisco Varela.7  
In this respect I would like to sketch of the outlines of such a project, which supports 
Husserl’s less characteristic standing-point in this question: so, we highlight such textual places 
in Husserl, in which he demarcates life and consciousness; that is to so: in which he makes a 
clear distinction between living and conscious organisms, stating that not every living being is 
conscious at the same time. We propagate this demarcation thesis, because in our opinion bi-
opsychism, like panpsychism (according to which every physical entity whatsoever has a cer-
tain sort of consciousness),8 wants to explain to much, and therefore it explains too little. In this 
context we would like to join the philosophical entertainment of Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gal-
lagher9 concerning a phenomenologically founded explanation of the origins and fundamental 
nature of consciousness, and particularly of conscious experience; an endeavour, which is open 
to the contemporary analytic philosophies of mind. Following the most important directives of 
the philosophical-scientific project of Zahavi and Gallagher, we focus on the problem of iden-
tifying such level of biological complexity, on which conscious activity in the widest sense of 
                                                          
4 Hua 14: 118, Hua 15: 432. 
5 Hua 5: 10, Hua 15: 50, 596, 609, Hua Mat 8 [= Husserliana Materialien]: 108, 171, 176, Hua 39: 272, Hua 42: 
165. See further: Nam-In Lee: Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte. Dordrecht: Springer, 1993: 225-
230.  
6 Lynn Margulis: “The Conscious Cell”. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, (2001) 929, 55–70. 
7 Humberto Maturana &Francisco Varela: Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the Living. Dordecht: D. 
Reidel Publishing Co., 1973. 
8 See e.g. David Chalmers: “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”. In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (ed.): Con-
sciousness in the Physical World. Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015: 
246-276. William E. Seager: “Consciousness, information, and panpsychism”. In Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies (1995) 2 (3):272-88.  
9 Dan Zahavi & Shaun Gallagher: The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cog-
nitive Science. London & New York: Routledge, 2008. 
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the word, the lowest level of consciousness, something, what could be called minimal mind,10 
could be found at all. In description of the fundamental nature of this minimal mind, and also 
in explanation of lowest level of conscious experience in lower level animals, we highly rely 
on Husserl’s analyses. In this present article I would like to treat the overall features of Husserl’s 
theory of animal and animal consciousness; with a special regard to what Husserl’s notion of 
animality and constitution of animal being could yield for the contemporary researches con-
cerning the origins of consciousness and the basic level of conscious experience in animals.  
In Husserl the constitution of corporeality (Leiblichkeit) and empathy are crucial topics in 
the context of constitution of animality and animal beings. On a higher level of constitution 
Husserl – just like the classical authors of French phenomenology (such as Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty and Lévinas) – emphasized the embodied nature of consciousness. What is even more: 
he explicitly stated that the ego is never a mere point-like, metaphysical substance, outside the 
world; but bodily existence is an essential feature of every possible subject; he highlighted that 
corporeality is a fundamental aspect of mental, psychic being and experience in general. Subject 
and subjectivity without corporeality is a bare abstraction.11 Corporeality is what links a subject 
to the world, is what places the subject within the environment of things and other subjects. We 
experience the other subject’s body as the body of the other subject; as an immediate expression 
of his/her internal mental life. The intentionality which is directed to the other subject’s lived 
body (Leib) is called empathy. The question concerning the emergence of consciousness in 
natural world, or concerning the lowest level of consciousness (minimal mind), is strongly cor-
related (but by no means identical) with the question of widest possible range of empathy; when 
in empathy we experience, we face a conscious being like us.12 Scientifically articulated: it is 
the question of philosophically (and scientifically) legitimate attribution of consciousness to 
                                                          
10 For the concept of “minimal mind” see e.g.: Vincent Joseph Torley: The Anatomy of Minimal Mind (Ph.D. 
dissertation, 2007). Hyperlink: http://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/Anatomy.pdf (Date of last download: 13 
October 2018).  
An essential difference from Torley’s standing-point and between us (between a phenomenologically founded 
notion of consciousness): that in Torley “phenomenality” or “quale” is not an essential feature of mind or of con-
sciousness. (Torley: “I refrain from assuming at the outset that a minimal mind has to be phenomenally conscious”. 
Op. cit.). In this particular regard I would like to join to the opinion of Zahavi and Gallagher, what could be said 
– I think – to be a basic element of a phenomenologically legitimate account of consciousness in general: that 
there is no consciousness without phenomenality. It is my conviction (and it is also a central assumption of Zahavi 
and Gallagher, and – I believe – of phenomenology in general) that phenomenal character is an a priori necessary, 
ineliminable structural component of any consciousness whatsoever. (In Zahavi and Gallagher see: 2008: 108-
120, 219f).  
In the context of this essay we use the term “minimal mind” to refer to the lowest level of consciousness. 
11 Cf. e.g. Hua 13: 229, Hua 14: 336, Hua 41: 380. Last place: “Eine Person kann konkret nicht sein, ohne einen 
Körper als Leib zu haben”. 
12 See e.g.: Husserl’s question whether we can feel empathy towards a jellyfish in a 1921 Manuscript (St. Märgen): 
Hua 14: 112-117. 
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non-human living beings, (and partly: also to other human beings). It is the problem of extended 
intersubjectivity.  
Treating subjects – also animal subjects – as embodied minds, Husserl (very much like 
Jakob von Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty) concretizes the consciousness-object or consciousness-
world relationship as subjective body (organism)-environment correlation. In the context of 
subjective, lived body-environment correlation, the minimal mind (as minimal animal mind), 
in Husserl, involves a minimal set of bodily capacities (a minimal set of “I can” [“Ich kann”]-
capabilities), behavioural structures, basic instinctive drives and tendencies, a stream of mini-
mal data, which – altogether – make up a minimal world or minimal environment. A minimal 
mind correlates with a minimal world; and in the quest for identifying the lowest level of con-
sciousness,13 we have to unfold the phenomenological structure of this minimal correlation. 
This is the subjective, first person view-side of the minimal mind. On the other side there is an 
objective, third person perspective access to the functioning (Fungierung) and expression of 
this minimal mind: the behaviour of the animal body, as an expression of the internal, mental 
life of a subject (supposing that we are speaking of such a complex level of behaviour, which 
allows us to suppose a subjective side or aspect of this bodily expression), and the functional 
apparatus of the organism in question. Husserl was aware of the fact that in the phenomenology 
of consciousness the problem of nervous system is not without any importance;14 as the objec-
tive side or part of the physio-psychological level of soul (Seele).15 
Focusing on Husserl’s own ideas on animal consciousness, we can roughly distinguish free 
main stages of his thought:16 the period of static account of animality and animal subjects (be-
tween approximately 1908-1916);17 the phase of genetic analyses (circa 1917/18-1928);18 and 
                                                          
13 We must also emphasize that this speech about “minimal mind” or “lowest level of consciousness” does not 
imply a critical acceptance of a rigid Cartesian dualism of mind-body distinction; so the acceptance of such an 
attitude with which Husserl himself – despite his positive, appreciative, often even laudative declaration on Des-
cartes – was always critical. 
We can also admit the possibility of a sort of proto-consciousness or a preliminary form of consciousness, which 
could be found much deeper than the level of clear, awaken phenomenal consciousness or experience. In Husserl 
we can also find this problematic under the name of phenomenology of unconscious (Unbewussten); in texts like 
e.g. Hua 11 (Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis [1919-1926]), 33 (Bernauer Manuskripten [1917/18]), 42 
(Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, I. section [editorial division, 1915-1934]). 
14 Cf. such references as e.g.: Hua 4: 138f, 156, 165, 189, 218, 231, 289-291, 343, 372f; Hua 13: 14, 216, 454; 
Hua 14: 68, 88; Hua 42: 137, 139f.   
15 Nervous system as a part of the physio-psychological level: especially in Ideas II (Hua 4). 
16 We shall add at once: the first closer look on the collection of Husserl’s works and manuscripts makes evident 
that there are no clear borders in the development of Husserl’s thoughts; it is only a rough simplification of a very 
complex and sophisticated line of evolution of his thinking – which has the sole function to make our task easier, 
in highlighting some peculiarities of Husserl’s theories in different stages of his career. 
17 Hua 4, 5, 13. 
18 Hua 9, 14, 32, Hua Mat 4. 
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the time when phenomenology of instincts became fundamental in his interpretation of subjec-
tivity and animal subjectivity in particular (after 1929).19 In his last period the phenomenon of 
generativity also gained a special significance concerning the problem of animal being.20 This 
present study will follow this order. 
1. The Static Constitution of Animality and Animal Consciousness 
Though we find the first systematic investigations concerning animality and animal conscious-
ness in the second and third volumes of Ideas (1912), Husserl’s interest in the problem of ani-
mals and constitution of animal being – at the latest – reaches back to the second half of the 
first decade of 1900. We can find references to this problem-field already in the manuscripts 
and lectures of the years 1907-1911.21 First the problem appeared (first and foremost) within 
the context of monadology; such a problematic which Husserl inherited partly from Leibniz and 
partly from Brentano. Husserl interprets “monads” as the fully concrete sphere of someone’s 
mental life. The first systematic documents of Husserl’s own monadology were manuscript B 
II 2, and the 1910/11 winter semester lecture The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. In such 
texts Husserl applies the term “monad” to every conscious subject, to human beings as well as 
to animals; at some places even to plants (although in a very speculative manner).22 Ideas II 
presents a quite high level and matured version of his monadology. According to Husserl (in 
Ideas II) to every pure ego (reines Ich) belongs a fully concrete psychic ego (seelisches Ich), as 
a monadic reality, which is constituted by the pure ego.23 Animals, (in the interpretation of 
Ideas II), as psychic subjects (seelische Subjekten), also have their own pure ego; and they 
constitute themselves in the form of animality, as animal realities.24 Important in this context 
that in this period, before the systematic elaboration of the genetic method, transcendental sub-
ject is only a pure, merely formal entity: the pure ego – without any contents – is the source of 
every constitution and every constituted objects, and the psychic ego (seelisches Ich) or the 
monad is yet nothing but a constituted objectivity (Gegenstandlichkeit).  In the 1920s years 
                                                          
19 Hua 15, 39, 42, Hua Mat 8. 
20 To “generativity” see: Anthony Steinbock: Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. Ev-
anston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1995. 
21 First of all: Ms. B II 2 (partly published in Hua 13 and Hua 42), B I 4 (unpublished), The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology (Hua 13: text No. 6 [English <2006>]), Lectures on ethics and value theory, 1908-1914 (Hua 28). 
In this lastly mentioned volume see e.g. Hua 28: 399ff; (comparisons between human and animal being in the 
context of philosophy of morals – from the 1902 summer semester lecture, Basic Questions of Ethics). 
22 See Hua 42: 165. “Möglich wären auch Bewusstseine, geknüpft an Pflanzen, an alle organischen Wesen, auch 
an physische Systeme, die irgendwelche Analogie mit organischen Systemen haben: Sonnensysteme und am Ende 
die ganze Welt (die ja nie eine real geschlossene Endlichkeit sein kann)”.  
23 Cf. e.g. Hua 4: 108, 111. 
24 Cf. e.g. op. cit. 120, 134. 
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Husserl develops the concept of “transcendental person”,25 who is rich in concrete contents and 
capacities, and who is a constituting agent also. 
In this period (between 1907 and 1912) Husserl applies such a phenomenological method; 
which he later, retrospectively labels as “static analysis”.26 Static analysis or static constitution 
unfolds already formed, finished and crystallized formations and structures of sense and expe-
rience; accomplished objectivities. The static investigations unfold a fix order of constitutive 
layers – such an order, which we meet in the second book of Ideas: purely material nature, 
animate, psychophysical nature and spiritual-cultural world. In this framework, from a consti-
tutive point of view, the most fundamental, ultimately founding layer is physical nature; it 
founds animate-animal (seelische) reality, and this latter founds spiritual and cultural reality. 
These three are the most general, most important spheres of reality – though, the higher levels 
(beyond the plane of physical reality) are abstract in themselves, apart from the lower, founding 
layer of being.  
Already within the framework of static phenomenology, we meet extremely complicated 
and entangled constitutive relationships. Even the constitution of a solipsistic form of nature, a 
merely material environment without every reference to other subjects, self-constitution of the 
subject – with her/his material body (Körper) – and the constitution of material environment is 
intrinsically correlated and interwoven; one cannot be constituted without the constitution of 
the other. They are mutually dependent. There is a circular, “zigzag” connection between them. 
The constitution of a single material thing implies the coordination of several different sensuous 
fields, it implicates a complicated mode of synaesthesia; the continuous, harmonious constitu-
tion of the vision of one and the same object during the correlated bodily motion of the subject; 
such as moving in space, turning the head, movements of the eyes, etc.27 But the phenomenon 
which emerges from these series of coherent and harmonious constitution, from the coordina-
tion of several different, harmoniously flowing sensuous data of different sensory organs and 
from these movements of the body, is still not the concrete, single material thing. What we 
have yet is still a phantom:28 a visually, perceptually concrete thing, without substantiality and 
causality. In order to have a fully concrete, at least from a certain point of view “accomplished” 
                                                          
25 To this see: Sebastian Luft: “Husserl’s Concept of the «Transcendental Person»: Another Look at the Husserl-
Heidegger Relationship”. In id.: Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2011: 126-158. 
26 To this see: Sebastian Luft: “A Hermeneutic Philosophy of Subjective and Objective Spirit. Husserl, Natorp and 
Cassirer”. In id.: 2011: 235-267 (especially: 247ff). Furthermore: Hua 11: 336-345 (“Statische und genetische 
phänomenologische Methode” [1921]).  
27 For the details of such analyses in the early Husserl see e.g.: Hua 16 (Thing and space-lectures [1907]) and the 
first section of Ideas II. 
28 See: Hua 16: 78, Hua 4: 22, 36ff. Later: Hua 11: 23, 301ff, 362.  
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or “finished” object, we have to constitute materiality (substantiality) and causality also. Which 
can only happen through the constitution of a complex set of things, through the constitution of 
a material environment, which unfolds the mutual dependences and interactions between 
things. Causality and materiality are unfolded (and constituted) within the framework of a dy-
namic, changing environment of things; where causality refers to the mutual dependence and 
interrelations of entities on the one hand, and substantiality – on the other hand – expresses the 
individual, independent nature of objects. An important factor of the context is to know that 
substantiality and causality here treated in a transcendental way; they are regarded as for-
mations of sense, and attributed to things in this way; they count as a special way, in which 
things are constituted. 
[On the basis of the nexus of concrete material things, which is characterized with the at-
tributes of substantiality and causality, animality could emerge and could be constituted, as a 
higher level phenomenon. An animate thing, a living organism, in Husserl is such a reality, 
which is a material substance, but which stands in a sensitive, flexible and dynamic relationship 
with its environment; in such a type of relationship, which is complex enough to be character-
ized as a sort of behaviour (Verhalten). A living being is in constant change, during which it 
strives after self-preservation, after preservation of its own individuality over against the envi-
ronment. It is capable of self-control and self-determination; in a growing degree of complexity, 
which is correlated to its biological complexity. That is to say: there is a well-observable cor-
relation between the complexity of behaviour and the complexity of the biological structure of 
the organism in question. We are talking about the problem of constitution of life as a physically 
visible phenomenon (so: about the constitution of objective side of life). The living being is not 
just a material stuff, a dead, mechanical thing. It is such an entity, which strives constantly for 
keeping its integrity, its relative independence within the environment, to find those materials 
and fulfil those needs, which make possible of its relatively independent existence, (that is to 
say: which keep it alive). The dynamic set of those striving tendencies and actions are called 
behaviour.  
In Husserl the animate layer of nature has further three major levels: 1) psychophysiologi-
cal level, which connects the organism immediately to the realm of nature. Through psycho-
physiological reality the living being fits into the causal order, into the universal nexus of na-
ture. 2) The idiopsychical layer, which expresses the specifically psychological sphere of the 
living being; the internality of lived experiences. 3) The intersubjective level; the intersubjec-
tive, communicative connections between animated beings, which is already present at the level 
of animals.  
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A fundamental question is how causality turns into motivation? The living being stands in 
causal relationship with the material reality. The organism, due to its biological structure, its 
cellular network, is in a constant communication with its environment, which is a causal process 
on the side incoming stimuli. These causal and micro-causal (cell- and even lower-level) pat-
terns lay the foundation of motivational structures on the active, behavioural side of the living 
being. The causality, so-to-say, continuously melts into motivation. The motivation is corre-
lated with a set of possible behavioural responses. The more complex the living being in ques-
tion is, the more complex and flexible its behavioural structure. And, from a phenomenological 
point of view, behaviour is the expression of the mental inside. Husserl rejects psychophysical 
parallelism; though he sensitively and sophisticatedly integrates the soul and animated realities, 
through the lived body—physical body connection (Leib-Körper) into the causal order of na-
ture]. 
2. The Genetic Origins of Animality and Animal Consciousness 
“Der Grundcharakter der Phänomenologie ist also wissenschaftliche Lebensphilosophie” 
(Natur und Geist, 1927, [Hua 27: 241]) 
The genetic “breakthrough” of phenomenology (around 1916/1917)29 placed in a much wider 
context the problem of life. The genetic analysis disclosed every sense and every structure as a 
product of an apriori, transcendental genesis. More precisely: it unfolded everything in the 
process of becoming; it connected to every object (or objective fact or situation), as a result, a 
history; such a history which had an empirical and transcendental aspect. The genetic phenom-
enology, so-to-say, “bracketed the concept of «object»”,30 as an outcome or end-product. In the 
end: genetic phenomenology unfolded the whole world, the entire reality as a process. Within 
this framework the genetic aspects of constitution of corporeality, animality and animal consti-
tution became accessible and visible. The genetic approach showed the constitutional relation-
ships between life, animality, corporeality and environment much more dynamic and sophisti-
cated, as they were for the static description of those phenomena.  
With the genetic phenomenology, the concept of “life” became central for Husserl, (though 
it was an important topic for him, earlier too); as we can clearly see it in Bernau Manuscripts 
(1917/18). The “life” first and foremost was for him the immanent life of human consciousness 
(more precisely: the consciousness or conscious life of a fully matured, intelligent, thinking 
                                                          
29 Cf.: Hua 13: 346-357. See also: Rudolf Bernet—Iso Kern—Eduard Marbach: Edmund Husserl. Darstellung 
Seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2016: 181.  
30 The phrasing of Tamás Ullmann: A láthatatlan forma. Sematizmus és intencionalitás. Budapest: L’Harmattan, 
2016. (The Invisible Forma. Schematism and Intentionality). (In Hungarian). 
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transcendental subject); but it has certain lower levels. Such levels appeared in him (yet within 
the context of genetic phenomenology, or – at least – accompanied with genetic analyses), in 
his lectures Nature and Spirit, which he kept in 191931 and 1927. In this period, we can also 
meet the problem of genetic constitution of animality, and particularly of animal consciousness 
in texts like Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (1918-1926), the second volume 
of On the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity (1921-1928) and Phenomenological Psychology 
(1925). In the writings of this stage, the problem of animality appeared in the context of the 
correlated constitution of immanent and transcendent aspects and moments of life; where this 
constitution was understood as a genetic process, as a form of becoming. 
Though there are eight years between the two lecture Nature and Spirit, both had the con-
cept and problem of “life” in their centre. Those lectures could be placed in the context of the 
methodological debates concerning the method of social sciences in the first half of the 20th 
century; that took place between the positivists (who represented the view that the method of 
social sciences must be identical with the method of natural sciences) and anti-positivists (who 
had the convincement that the method of natural and social sciences must be different, and 
social sciences had a method, which is peculiar to the social-cultural sphere); (which latter 
standing-point was mostly represented by Neo-Kantians). Husserl – not surprisingly – propa-
gated the anti-positivist side in the methodological debates of the early 1900s. Husserl had been 
always against homogenizing reductionism; he had been always very sensitive to the peculiar-
ities and particular differences of the different regions of objects; such as most generally the 
spheres of nature and spirit. He even emphasized the differences within such general regions. 
He claimed that those spheres demand different methodological attitudes: such as naturalistic 
and personalistic stance. But Husserl did not only distinguish, differentiate – his strategy was 
much more sophisticated, than articulating a rather obvious and simple dualism. He – at the 
same time – through the chain of mutually joined differences and connections, built bridges 
between every level of being and constitution; he – simultaneously – created a continuous scale 
of transitions everywhere within the sphere of reality. He was a monist; but he represented and 
articulated his monism in a very differentiated and sophisticated way.  
Most importantly: the universal, central phenomenon, which unities those different spheres 
(the most general regions of nature and spirit) is that of life. It is life which articulates and 
constitutes itself on the different levels and degrees of reality; in different forms and grades of 
                                                          
31 In the 1919 lecture Husserl did not use the term “genetic”. But there is the expression “passive process”. Hua 
Mat 4: 178. And the lecture itself already shows the overall features of genetic approach. 
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complexity. The complexity of life is expressed in its immanent and transcendent; the complex-
ity we are talking about is the complexity of its (immanent and transcendent) expressions and 
modes of functioning (Fungierung). This life constitutes itself in forms of cellular (microbial), 
vegetative life-forms (plants) and in lower and higher level animals; with mutually and insepa-
rably connected immanent and transcendent moments.32 The systematic and coherent objective 
connections (gegenständliche Zusammenhänge) on the levels of non-organic (inanimate) nature 
refer already to the level of organicity and to animate reality; so, the inanimate nature in its 
systematic, cohesive objective connectedness could be regarded (according to Husserl) as a pre-
form of organic nature. Under the genetic scope we could treat and understand the self-consti-
tution of life, the interaction and connection of its different (immanent and transcendent) mo-
ments, in a much richer and much more accurate way than earlier. 
Similarly to Ideas II, in the lecture Nature and Spirit 1919 we can meet a threefold division 
in constitution of animality: 1) the animate physical body, which is the proper topic of zoology, 
2) the animate lived body (Leib) as a sensitive-sensing body and 3) the animate soul (ani-
malische Seele) as such.33 This distinction refers to constitutive levels of the monadic reality; 
to levels of monadic and inter-monadic self-constitution. Monadic realities have animate psy-
chic internality (Innerlichkeit). The monads constitute themselves as a member of a communi-
cating monadic community and as having a body; a body with its immanent and transcendent 
moments, so as lived and physical body at the same time (Leib and Körper). Constituting them-
selves as bodily beings, as embodied subjects, the monads are constituted as integrated in the 
universal causal connections and chains of material nature.  
How can we reconstruct the internal aspect of a monad? How do we know what is it like 
to be a bat? Or what is it like to be a jellyfish?34 According to Husserl: through a genetic dis-
mantling analysis. We unfold the lowest layers of primal passivity,35 and on the basis of such 
reconstructions we can make as assumptions concerning the mental internality of non-human 
animal subjects (or concerning even lower level subjects). There must be a sort of hyletic flow, 
a flow of stimuli and affections from the environment, and a sort of sensuous surrounding 
                                                          
32 This “inseparable connectedness” does not involve in Husserl that every physical event in the body of an organ-
ism must imply a psychological, mental event (as in Spinoza); it implicates the fact that there is a very close, 
apriori connection between the immanent and transcendent side of life, and higher grades of biological complexity 
in a way or another is expressed in the complexity of psychic, mental life also – but it (this inseparableness of 
immanent and transcendent aspects of life) does not implicate that every physical moment and event of a living 
being must be conscious also.  
33 Hua Mat 4: 212. 
34 Cf. Hua 14: 112ff.  
35 In the 1920s Husserl tries to disclose and clear up that (fundamentally and ultimately passive) layer of subjec-
tivity in the texts of Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (Hua 11). 
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world, built up from the complexity of those primal data and affections. It is a (primal) world 
of potential and actual threats, dangers, resources, enemies (predators) and mates, sexual part-
ners, etc. Those factors and members of the environing world are referred to or represented by 
the patterns of the aforementioned data, affections and stimuli. The animal instinctively opens 
up to such an environment. At some places Husserl makes systematic efforts to reconstruct the 
internal reality of such lower level subjects.36  
3. The Instinctive Foundations of Animal Consciousness 
We can meet analyses and considerations concerning the phenomenological problem of in-
stincts throughout the entire career of Husserl.37 There are remarks on that in Logical Investi-
gations (1900/01), in his lengthy and unpublished Studies on the Structure of Consciousness 
(1901-1914),38 and in Ideas (1912) for example. Before the 1920s the concept of instinct was 
taken as a mundane, constituted phenomenon; something objective. In this regard Husserl’s 
standing point changed fundamentally in the early 1920s. He discovered the topic of “transcen-
dental instinct”; so such a conception of instinct, which is not a finished, objective, constituted 
phenomenon, but itself also a sort of constituting intentionality; a passive intentional constitu-
tive tendency. The first systematic train of thought on this reinterpreted version of instinct, as 
passive, instinctive intentionality, could be found in his St. Märgen manuscripts. from the Au-
tumn of 1921.39 But the problem-field of the phenomenology of instincts became really im-
portant for him after 1928, especially in the 1930s, when this field gained the outlines of a 
systematic theory in Husserl’s late manuscripts. What is even more: I think we can agree with 
Nam-In Lee in that regard, that – according to Lee – the theory of transcendental instinct be-
came central and foundational in the late Husserl. 
Earlier instincts where structural components of the real psychic content of the soul or the 
monadic subject. They were something juxtaposed to the constituting pure ego; they belonged 
to the way in which the souls, as mundane, real entities, were constituted. When Husserl elab-
orated genetic phenomenology, and genetic method came to the fore, this situation had changed, 
and another approach or way of interpretation concerning the instincts became possible. This 
change – in my opinion – was in strong connection with the reinterpretation of monads, as 
concrete constituting subjects, and with the researches of the fundamental layers of passivity 
also; (both were crucial topics in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis and in the 
                                                          
36 See the example of jellyfish here: Hua 14: 112-116.  
37 Cf. Lee 1993. 
38 Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. Ms. M III 3 II I. 
39 Ms. A VII 13. 
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second part of Intersubjectivity-volumes too [Hua 14]). After 1921 instincts also had the mean-
ing of constituting passive tendencies of the subjectivity; such blind strivings which disclosed 
the world in an instinctive way. But it was not before 1928/29, when Husserl realized their 
central importance concerning phenomenological constitution in general; as an ultimate, found-
ing layer or level of explanation. In my interpretation the phenomenology of instincts also has 
a special role in reconstruction of animal consciousness and in explication of emergence of 
consciousness in general.  
Important is in this context another cardinal change in Husserl’s view: the change of rela-
tionship between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. Before the 1920s the standing-point of 
Logical Investigations counted as a standard position: “Each intentional experience is either an 
objectifying act or has its basis in such an act”.40  This position became problematic in the 
1920s, although in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis he still endorses the foun-
dational role of objectifying acts in relationship to non-objectifyings.41 The precedence of ob-
jectifying acts over non-objectifyings meant that to lived experiences of emotions, feelings, 
evaluations or even instincts and drives (those are the non-objectifying acts) objectifying inten-
tionality (so: a presentation [Vorstellung] with – a relatively – clear object) gives objective 
direction and relatedness. There must be the presentation of an object, before we could experi-
ence feelings, emotions, instinctive inclinations, etc. In the 1930s42 this relationship turned to 
the opposite way in an unambiguous manner (paraphrasing the above cited statement): Each 
intentional experience is either a non-objectifying act or has its basis in such an act. Non-
objectifying acts (feelings, moods, emotions, drives) – as passive intentionalities – founded the 
objectifying acts, as active intentionalities or presentations. According to this new view there 
is a primal passive (urpassive) streaming of pre-objective data and non-objectifying acts, from 
which any objective can emerge.  
According to Husserl there is passive intentionality, without objects. That passive inten-
tionality founds active, objectifying intentionality. This passive intentionality could be charac-
terized as drive-intentionality, as instinctive intentionality; which is a blind striving to fulfil-
ment, a purely passive tendency. These passive tendencies reach out to the environing world; 
and they realize a passive, instinctive disclosure of this world; they direct and open up the sub-
ject (as instinctive ego or pre-ego) to the world and to stimuli and affections coming from the 
world. Furthermore: instinctive intentionality does not separate the subject from the world, it 
                                                          
40 Hua 19/1: 514. English (2001/2): 167.   
41 Hua 31: 6f.  
42 E.g.: in C-Manuscripts (Hua Mat 8) and Hua 15.  
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does not juxtapose the former with the latter, but it is the ultimate explanatory element in Hus-
serl’s theory which grants the coherent unity of subject and world. In Husserl’s late, systematic 
theory of instincts, non-objectifying instincts founded objectifyings; in him there were lower 
and higher level instincts. [Non-objectifying instincts were instinctive tendencies of feeding, 
sexuality, avoid threat (instinctual fear), the child’s instinctive relationship to the mother, etc. 
All these instincts are collected under the title of “self-preservation”43 as fundamental instinct. 
On this set of non-objectifying instincts are objectifyings based. In Husserl’s interpretation the 
most basic objectifying instinct is curiosity, which is the basis of every cultural achievement, 
of every scientific, philosophical efforts, as well as of arts. According to Husserl there are ra-
tional, cultural instincts – which belong to the realm of objectifying instincts. Self-preservation 
also had its higher realization or higher effectuation on the level of culture, as ethical and cul-
tural self-preservation. Every active effort had – in Husserl – an instinctive, passive under-
ground, basement which articulated and formed the latitude or play-field of activity.] 
The transcendental instincts unify the monads (as transcendental subjects) in an instinctive 
community.44 They constitute themselves as members of a universal transcendental instinctive 
community, and they constitute their bodily being, environment in a necessary manner. The 
bodily existence of monads, and their bodily community (as collective corporeity)45 is an inev-
itable expression and outcome of their self-constitution; (which, in the end, proves to be a col-
lective, intersubjective self-constitution). The links of the chain of the collective self-constitu-
tion of the monads in the form of a universally joined instinctive community fit to each other 
in a continuous and harmonious way; in Husserl’s description – with the emphasis and sensitive 
analysis of the differences – there is no unbridgeable gap in the process of self-constitution of 
transcendental intersubjectivity, to which animals also belong as lower level transcendental 
subjects.  
How can we reconstruct the internal, psychic structures of animal monads, within this the-
oretical framework of transcendental instincts? In Husserl there is a difference between specif-
ically human and non-human instincts (more precisely: not exclusively human instincts). The 
cultural, rational instincts are characteristic to human beings; the lower level instincts (amongst 
objectifying instincts: the instinct towards perception, and non-objective instincts) to animal, to 
non-human subjects. In the first section of this paper we mentioned “self-preservation” (or 
striving after self-preservation) as a characteristic feature of living beings or as animality as 
                                                          
43 E.g. Hua Mat 8: 172, 431. Hua 42: 98ff.  
44 Cf. e.g. Hua 15: 181, 597ff. 
45 Hua 39: 181. 
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such. We just have to take look on what is absolutely (or subsidiarily) necessary for an organism 
to sustain or preserve itself – and that would give as a clue of reconstructing its internality, the 
structure of its animal, animate being. There is a flow of pre-objective, non-objective hyletic 
data, in which those formations and patterns get the highest prominence, which are – potentially 
– most relevant from the self-preservation of the living being in question. For the living being 
those affects and stimuli are the most important, which would potentially (or actually) lead it 
to fulfilment. The instincts so-to-say push or drive the organism towards the environing world, 
and lead it (him or her) in it, which they disclose to it (him or her), in such a specific way, which 
is characteristic to the living being, we are talking about. The more complex a living being is 
the more sophisticated and richer apparatus of (transcendental) instincts it has, and the richer 
the environment is around it.  
A central moment of the late Husserl’s philosophy of history, namely generativity, also has 
an ineliminable connection with his philosophy of instincts, and has its ultimate foundations in 
the latter, in his conception of transcendental instincts. Generativity is a basic feature of inter-
subjective constitution: such capacity of a community to create culture and tradition, and to 
inherit it from one generation to another.46 In Husserl generativity (so to create and preserve a 
cultural world and heritage throughout the work and collaboration of several generations) in the 
strict sense is the peculiarity of human beings. Generativity has its foundations in the cultural, 
creative instincts of rational monads (humans). According to Steinbock, in Husserl there is no 
animal generativity (animal tradition or traditionality)47 – because (in Steinbock’s Husserl-in-
terpretation) “every animal generation” “merely repeats its environing world with the peculiar 
typicality of its particular species”.48 But I think this interpretation of Husserl is a little one-
sided. Yes, there are textual places, according to which in Husserl’s opinion there is no animal 
generativity in the strict sense of the word. But in a wider sense – according to Husserl – there 
is animal generativity. And we can endorse this latter opinion from the point of view of modern 
ethology: there is animal culture (especially in the case of higher level animal, in primates e.g.) 
and social learning in animals. They learn some – in the wide sense of the word – culturally 
shaped patterns and practices from their parents and wider social environment, which they 
transmit to their offsprings; and what is even more important: they (the animals) can change, 
improve and perfect those learnt technics and practices; which is already culture and cultural 
                                                          
46 The term “generativity”, as Steinbock draws our attention to that fact, has a double meaning in Husserl: it refers 
to the process of “generation”, of “becoming” or “emergence”, and it also refers to the “chain of generations”. 
Husserl, as Steinbock point out, uses both meanings in his texts. Cf. Steinbock 1995: 3. 
47 Steinbock 1995: 198.  
48 Loc. cit.  
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tradition in the narrower sense.49 This is characteristic to higher level animals, and something 
instinctively based and articulated; but this points toward the direction of humanity and human 
tradition; so towards higher levels of intersubjective constitution, and thus also bridges the gap 
between human and animal world, and creates a continuous connection between these two 
realms, between mere animality and spirituality.   
 
                                                          
49 Cf. e.g. A. Whiten et al. “Cultures in chimpanzees”. In Nature 399, pages 682–685 (17 June 1999). 
